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An Approach for New Standards of Admission
BY WM.

HEDGES ROBINSON' ]R.
President, Colorado Bar A ssociation

Since publication of my article in the August issue of Dicta, I have
received letters and telephone calls and held many conversations dealing with
overcrowding of the profession and suggesting remedies. I believe that some
of the more well-considered suggestions should be printed so that the bar, the
Supreme Court, and the law schools can discuss them and eventually arrive
at a common meeting ground.
The plan that seems to meet the situation as simply as possible and yet
give proper safeguards to the public, the student, and the bar, affords every
promise of bettering the legal profession It imposes obligations on the bench,
the bar, the law schools, and the student, thus tending to unify the entire
profession. Under this plan, all freshmen students at the end of their course
of study would be given a comprehensive examination on those courses by the
bar examiners. The deans of the three law schools would be ex-officio members
of the State Board of Bar Examiners. Failure to pass this examination would
mean that the student could not take the second year examination. He could,
however, continue the course in the law school. Students who did not desire
to be admitted to practice in Colorado could complete their legal training
without being required to take or pass these comprehensive examinations.
After passage of the freshman examination and upon completion of the
second year in law school, the student would be required to take and pass an
examination covering second year law school subjects. Similarly at the end of
the third year, he must take and pass the third year examination. Not more
than two yearly examinations could be taken in any twelve month period by
a student. Two failures in any yearly examination would bar the student from
taking further examinations.
After passing the third year examination and being ~pprovcd after_ a
morals investigation, the student would be given a limited license to practJce
205"
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which would entitle him to appear before all trial courts, but not before any
appellate court. Within six months after the new lawyer began to practice,
he would be required to as..oociate himself with an experienced and approved
attorney of his own selection. It would be possible for the young lawyer to
practice by himself, but for a period of a year he would be under the guidance
of an experienced lawyer.
At the end of a three to five year period, the new lawyer could then
apply for an unlimited license. If the record of the applicant were in order,
and upon the passage of an examina tion limited to appellate practice and
procedure in the state and federal courts, the applicant would be given an
unrestricted license. H e would be free to use the restricted license only during
all of his practice if he so desired.
Nothing in the plan would prohibit a student from securing a law degree
without taking or passing the yearly exa minations. But such a student could
not be admitted to practice in C olorado until after five years of practice
elsewhere. No lawyer from any other state could be admitted to practice in
Colorado until after (1) the N ational Conference of Bar Examiners had
reported favorably upon the professional reputat ion and integrity of the
applicant, and (2) the applicant had passed a comprehensive and thorough
examination in which emphasis was placed primarily upon the applicant"s
knowledge of Colorado law and procedures. Of course, students from other
schools desiring to practice in C olorado would be required to take the yearly
examinations.
A s an adjunct to this plan, the requirements for entrance to the law
schools should include a four year pre-legal course with at least minimum
requirements in English, English composition, A merican and English history,
accounting, economics, political science, perhaps some medical knowledge
dealing chiefly with medical terminology and anatomy, and related subject.;.
The course in law schools should be comprehensive but with more emphasis
than is customary on modern p rocedures and techniques. The night school
course should be placed on a four year basis.
T he plan is so simple and just that it is great won der that it has not been
adopted before this. It weeds out early in his collegia te career, the obvio~
mcompetent and, with little waste, turns him to a vocational trail where hts
talents can be better utilized. T hus it saves these studen ts time and money. It
ensures that the education of all law students is uniform and sufficiently com·
prehensive. It makes a working team of the law schools, the profession, and
the Supreme Court. It eliminates the undesirable applicants from other stat~,
and ma kes certain that unless the applicant has a sound reason and opportunity
for practice in Colorado he will not apply for admission .
. It provides guidance for the young lawyer when he most needs assistance,
advtce, and a friendly hand. Finally it guarantees to the public that _o~Y
soundly educated and trained men and women can be admi tted to pracuce 10
Colorado.
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AN EPOCHAL EPIC
Entitled

All the Law West of the Pecos, or Roy Bean's
Dream, or Dirty Goethe's Diabolical Dilemma,
or, Ten Nights in Der Fleiderhaus, or,
The Romance of the Reaming
of The Redman
A farce of 97.3% pure corn, with 500 Beautiful Girls, count them, 5001
To be rendered (sic) at the Fine Arts (?) Theatre, at
8:30 Friday evening. October 14, 1949.
When your Editor innocently requested a bit of advance publicity on the
Law Club show which is to be given on the second night of the Colorado
Bar Association convention at Colorado Springs, the above blurb was the
result-verbatim. It was the only result, but from these terse and turgid
lines of Dudley Strickland, director of the epic, you may gather what is in
store for those brethren and sistern hardy enough to attend.
Despite Mr. Strickland's dubiety, the Fine Arts Museum does contain
some interesting and excellent works, and for the more serious-minded conven
tion-goers its halls will be open from 7:30 on Friday evening preceding the
Law Club show at 8:30.
Another entertainment feature of the 51st annual convention at the
Broadmoor will be the Grand Ball and Dance on Saturday evening, October
15, following the main banquet. The latter will honor members of the Federal
judiciary and will be high-lighted by the remarks of Judge Charles E. Clark
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Denver Adopts Real Estate Standard No. 62
The Real Estate Standards committee of the Denver Bar Association
on August 30, 1949 adopted and promulgated the following additional title
standard:
Standard No. 62-NOTICE ON APPLICATION FOR LETTERS
OF CONSERVATORSHIP
Problem: After a legal adjudication of mental incompetency, is it necessary to give notice to the incompetent of an application for
the appointment of a Conservator?
Answer: No.
Mr. Whittelshofer, chairman of both the Denver and state committees,
has distributed copies of the new standard to members of the state standards
committee for their study and possible recommendation to the annual convention in October.
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Policies Adopted by the Medical-Legal Committee

of the Colorado State Medical Society and
The Joint Professions Committee of
The Colorado Bar Association
The joint committee on the professions was established by the Colorado
Bar Association in 1947 in an effort to resolve conflicts between the medical
and legal professions. Currently, the lawyer membership of the committee is
Ronald V. Yegge, Samuel S. Sherman, Jr., and T. Raber Taylor. This committee has had many conferences and as a result is suggesting that the following "Declaration of Policy" be adopted by the Colorado Medical Society
and the Colorado Bar Association. It will be presented to the meeting in
October for consideration by the convention. Any lawyer having suggestions
concerning the policy declaration should write to Mr. Yegge, Equitable
Building, Denver 2, Colorado.
By reason of combined discussions and meetings, the Medical-Legal
Committee of the Colorado State Medical Society and the Joint Professions
Committee of the Colorado Bar Association have adopted the following
policies.as being to the advantage and welfare of the proper authority of the
respective organizations:
(1) The trial judge and the lawyers on each side of a case should
cooperate in the setting of trials so as to take into consideration the convenience
of the doctors who may testify on either side. Most physicians operate their
offices on scheduled appointments, and a lastminute request for a doctor to
testify is unfair not only to him but also to the patient, who may have been
waiting a month or more for an appointment with the doctor. This courtesy
should not only extend to the day of trial but even to the hour, and an understanding that the doctor may be placed on the stand out of order should be
encouraged.
(2) Proper fee arrangements to compensate him for time lost from his
office should be made with the doctor before trial, and assurance should be
given the doctor that his fee is not going to be dependent upon the outcome
of the litigation.
(3)
The rights of a patient in suit often are principally dependent
upon the medical evidence. Written reports from the doctor are not acceptable as evidence, except under special circumstances. The physician who is
unwilling to appear in court should so advise his patient upon learning of a
claim being made by the patient, so that another physician may be selected
to furnish the necessary testimony at the trial. A physician should refuse to
make an examination for an attorney or an insurance company unless he is
willing to later give his opinion in court.
(4) The medical and legal professions should endeavor to eliminate
and avoid false, colored and unfair testimony on the part of a physician or
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an attorney who might sponsor or solicit such type of testimony. The physician and lawyer engaging in this type of practice fortunately are very few,
but they are usually well-known to the lawyers and doctors. When an obvious
violation of ethics in this regard is noted in any particular case, proper steps
should be taken to furnish the respective disciplinary boards or committees
of the professions with all facts relative to any breach of ethics.

The New Federal Judicial Code
By the HON. ROYCE H. SAVAGE
U. S. District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following explanation of the new Federal judicial code
was presented by Judge Savage before the Annual Conference of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit on July 8, 1949.
The enactment of H. R. 3214 bearing the title "An Act to revise,
codify and enact into law Title 28 of the United States Code entitled
'Judicial Code and Judiciary' " was a monumental achievement of utmost importance to the bench and bar. This revision ranks in importance with the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Judicial Code of 1911.
The purpose of the bill, as the title implies, was to codify and revise
the laws relating to the federal judiciary and judicial procedure. No revision
of these laws had been made since 1911, and the judicial code enacted in
that year did not include all of the laws related to the subject. A tremendous
volume of additional legislation in this field had been enacted since 1911.
Much of the statutory material pertaining to the judiciary was in archaic
and ambiguous language and many statutory provisions had been repealed
by implication by later statutes. Many statutes relating to procedure had
been rendered wholly obsolete by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Obviously, the project to codify and revise the statutes dealing with the
judiciary and its procedures was very nuch in the public interest in order that
the law in this important field might be clarified and made more readily
available.
Revision, as distinguished from codification, required the substitution of
plain language for awkward terms, reconciliation of conflicting laws, repeal of
superseded sections, and consolidation of related provisions. By enacting the
bill into positive law as Title 28 of the United States Code, such title thereby became the law rather than merely prima facie -evidence of the law.
As finally enacted, the revision included all applicable laws in effect on
January 5, 1948. The revised code became effective on September 1, 1948.
Expert Advisory Committees Appointed
The Revision Committee of the House, with commendable foresight, enlisted the aid of a group of experts in approaching the task. They first obtained the services of the West Publishing Company and the Edward Thompson Company, two of the leading law publishing firms and compilers of the
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United States Code. An impartial advisory committee was appointed, composed of outstanding men with years of practical experience at the bar and
on the bench. The chairman of this committee was Judge Floyd E. Thompson, former chief justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, and among its members were Judge Justin Miller, former judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, Judge John B. Sanborn, Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and Walter P. Armstrong, former president of the American Bar Association. This committee
was assisted by Judge John J. Parker, Chief Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, who rendered valuable service as a judicial consultant. Judge Alexander Holtzoff and Professor James W. Moore, of
Yale University, two experts in the field of federal procedure, assisted the
committee as special consultants.
The Judicial Conference appointed a committee on the revision of the
judicial code, which likewise made a substantial contribution. Judge Albert
B. Mars, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

was chairman of that committee. The Chief Justice appointed a committee
of Supreme Court judges which aided in the solution of problems pertaining
to that court.
When the work was commenced, letters were mailed to all federal
judges, United States attorneys, deans of law schools and presidents of bar
associations inviting suggestions and criticisms. Any suggestions received
were studied, cataloged and made available to the revision staff. As the work
progressed, the advice of government officials was sought with respect to

problems affecting particular departments or agencies.
The material for revision was divided into six major categories. Part I
provides for organization of courts; Part II treats of the United States attorneys and marshals; Part III covers court officers and employees; Part IV
sets forth the provisions on jurisdiction and venue; Part V deals with procedure; and Part VI takes up particular proceedings. Within these parts, the
subject matter was arranged under appropriate chapter heads. The numbering system makes allowance for future legislation. Chapters were given odd
numbers leaving the even numbers available for related chapters containing
future acts. Sufficient section numbers were left between chapters to accommodate anticipated growth.
Concise Style Reduces Size of Code
A clear and uniform style was used. Concise and direct expressions
were employed rather than verbose, redundant and circuitous language. In
many instances, similar sections were consolidated without making fundamental changes. For example, three short sections in Chapter 43 pertaining
to appointment, tenure and fees of United States commissioners consolidated
51 sections of existing law scattered throughout the United States Code
Annotated. Section 507 outlines the duties of United States attorneys and
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consolidates 14 sections. Section 456, which deals with traveling expenses
of judges and Section 553 covering expenses of United States marshals consolidate 8 sections each. By such consolidation, bulk was reduced and repetitious, overlapping provisions telescoped with resulting improvement of style
and substance.
In carrying on the work of revision, the committee recognized the inadvisability of proposing changes in existing law which might provoke any
substantial controversies. If the bill had included remedial legislation with
respect to controversial matters, opposition undoubtedly would have developed which would have jeopardized the enactment of the bill. It was
deemed advisable to avoid changes in the existing law that would not meet
with substantially unanimous approval in order to ensure the success of the
undertaking. It was thought that the more controversial matters could be
settled later by introducing separate bills dealing with a particular subject
matter.
While the many changes made by revision of the code are not, with
respect to each change, perhaps, of great consequence, nevertheless when considered as a whole they undoubtedly add up to a very substantial improvement
and modernization of the law pertaining to the federal judiciary and judicial
procedure.
A bill was recently passed by Congress and approved by the President
on May 24, amending the new code and likewise amending Title 18, entitled "Crimes and Criminal Procedure". The amending bill was enacted in
order to correct typographical and other minor errors, make the language of
some sections conform more closely to the original law and remove ambiguities and supply omissions which had been discovered. It also incorporated into
revised Title 28 those laws enacted by the 80th Congress too late to be "ncluded in the revision bill. Any reference to particular code provisions will
take into account these amendments.
There were changes of nomenclature of which the bench and bar should
take notice. "The United States Circuit Court of Appeals" is now "The
United States Court of Appeals". The Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia is now one of the eleven courts of appeal. The statutory name
of a district court is "The United States District Court" for the particular
district. The senior judge of a court of appeals and of a district court is now
known as the "chief judge". The chief justice of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, the chief justice of the Court of Claims and the
chief justice of the District Court for the District of Columbia now each
bear the title of "chief judge" of their respective courts. The justices of such
courts are now referred to as judges. The Conference of Senior Circuit
Judges is now known as the "Judicial Conference of the United States." Its
membership consists of the Chief Justice and the chief judge of each of the
eleven circuits.
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Costs To Be Included in Judgment
The statutes covering the subject matter of costs to be charged in civil
actions in the district courts have been consolidated and greatly simplified.
One important change in procedure has been effected. It is provided that
a bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the
judgment or decree." This provision has been implemented by a local rule
recently adopted. This rule requires the party recovering a judgment for
costs to file with the clerk within ten days after entry of judgment, a verified
bill of costs by use of a form that will be provided for that purpose. The clerk
will tax the costs upon the filing of the bill, but any items included in the
bill may be reviewed by the court if a motion to retax costs is filed within
five days. It is important to realize that the judgment will not include costs
recovered by the prevailing party uniess the bill of costs is filed as required
by the rule. Furthermore, the action of the clerk in taxing costs in conformity
with the bill of costs filed becomes final unless the motion to retax is filed
within five days.
The original jurisdiction of the district courts is covered by Chapter 85
of the revised code. That chapter consists of six pages containing 29 short
sections. While Section 41 of the 1940 edition of Title 28, United States
Code Annotated, contained the jurisdictional provisions pertaining to the
district courts at the time the judicial code was codified in 1911, thereafter
more than 150 additional jurisdictional provisions were enacted by Congress
which are found in 29 other titles of the 1940 edition. The revision did not
result in substantial changes in the original jurisdiction of the district courts.
However, one new jurisdictional provision seems to be worthy of special
notice. It is provided that "district courts' shall have original jurisdiction,
concurrent with state courts, of any action on a bond executed under any
law of the United States."
Changes have been made in the law relating to venue of the district
courts. Diversity cases may be brought only in the district court where all
plaintiffs or all defendants reside. Actions wherein jurisdiction is not founded
solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the district where all
defendants reside. These provisions do not constitute a departure from the
existing law. But an additional provision has been inserted to the effect that the
residence of a corporation for venue purposes is in any judicial district in
which it is incorporated, or licensed to do business or is doing business.
This provision obviously enlarges the venue of the district courts in actions
brought against corporate defendants. However, a considerable enlargement
of the venue of actions against corporations had resulted from the decision of
the Supreme Court in Neirbo Company v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, 308 U. S. 165, holding, in effect, that a corporation, by appointing a
statutory service agent in compliance with state law, thereby consented to be
sued in any federal judicial district in such state. But this provision fixing
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the residence of corporations for venue purposes will set at rest many complicated questions raised with respect to the application of the rule in the
Neirbo case.
New Provisions Regarding Venue
Two new provisions have been added which appear to merit special attention. First, if a case is filed in a district which does not have venue of
the action, the court may dismiss or, in the interest of justice, may transfer the
cause to any district in which it could have been brought. Of course, timely
objection must be interposed to the venue, otherwise a waiver results. This
is an amended section. It originally previded that, if the venue was laid in
the wrong district, the court "shall" transfer to a district in which the action
could have been brought. It became apparent that a plaintiff might deliberately bring a suit in a district without venue of the action but where he could
get service on a defendant and such service would carry over if and when
the case was transferred to a district in which the action could have been
broilght. It was thought advisable to vest discretion in the court to either
dismiss or order the cause transferred in furtherance of justice. Second, a
district court having venue may, in the interest of justice, transfer any civil
action to any other district where it might have been brought. Two cases
were recently decided by the Supreme Court in which the contention was
made, in one case, that this statute does not authorize transfer of an action
brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act and, in the other case,
that it does not authorize the transfer of a case brought by the Government
under the Clayton Act. These contentions were rejected by the Supreme
Court and the orders entered by the respective district courts transferring
the cases were upheld.
These two sections authorizing transfer of cases have been implemented
by a local rule requiring the party procuring an order of transfer to file within
twenty days in the court to which the cause is removed a certified copy of all
papers on file in the action.
The new code effectuates a radical change in the procedure for removal
of actions from state courts to the federal courts. The new procedure calls
for the filing in the United States District Court of a verified petition containing a short and plain statement of the facts permitting removal, together
with a copy of all process, pleadings and orders served upon the removing
party in the action. The petition must be filed within 20 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of the copy of the
initial pleadings setting forth the claim for relief or within 20 days after
service of summons if initial pleading has not been filed in court and is not
required to he served on defendant, whichever period is shorter. If the case
stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a petition for removal may be
filed within 20 days after receipt by the defendant of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it first may be ascertained
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that the case has become removable. It must be accompanied by a bond
conditioned for payment of all costs should it be determined that the case
was improperly removed. Written notice of the filing of the. petition and
bond must be given to all adverse parties and a copy of the petition must be
filed with the clerk of the state court.
One significant change which has been made with respect to removable
actions is disclosed by the following provision:
"Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire
case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction."
This language is substituted for the old "separable controversy" provision.
Cases may not now be removed upon the ground that a separable controversy
is disclosed by the petition. A separate and independent claim or cause df action within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts must
be alleged. The discretion specifically given to the court to remand all nonremovable causes of action joined with the removable cause of action is noteworthy. It was my first impression that the elimination of the "separable
controversy" provision marked one of the more salutary improvements made.
It seems that I have never failed to experience difficulty in determining
whether a separable controversy has been alleged. But a recent experience
convinces me that I may have about the same difficulty in deciding when a
separate and independent claim has been stated.
Code Adopts Conference Recommendations on Habeas Corpus
The chapter on habeas corpus is of great importance and of particular
interest to the circuit judges and judges of districts in which penal institutions
are located. The problems arising from the frequent resort to the writ of
habaes corpus by inmates of penal institutions, both federal and state, first
received the attention of the Judicial Conference of the United States in
1942 when the late Chief Justice Stone appointed a committee to make a
study of the matter. Judge Vaught was a member of that committee. Two
separate bills prepared by the committee were approved by the conference
and caused to be introduced in Congress. These proposed bills engaged our
attention and, at the meeting of our conference in 1947, a resolution urging
that the bills be passed was unanimously adopted. The code provisions enact
into law substantially the recommendations of the Judicial Conference embodied in these bills. Four important things are accomplished by the code
provisions pertaining to habeas corpus: (1)repetitious applications for the
writ by persons convicted of crime are forestalled by a provision invoking
the principle of res judicata in a modified form; (2) a simplified procedure is
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established for the hearing of the cases; (3) in respect of federal prisoners,
provision is made for relief by motion filed in the sentencing court and the
right to relief by habeas corpus in such cases is extremely limited; and (4) in
case of state prisoners, resort to the lower federal courts is practically eliminated where an adequate remedy is provided by state law.
One or two other additions might be of interest. Prior to the revision of
the code, the state law governed the qualifications and exemptions of jurors
in the federal courts. The new code for the first time sets up a federal standard of qualifications for jury service. It is provided, however, that persons
who are incompetent to serve as jurors in state courts are ineligible to serve
in United States district courts. Exemptions under state law do not apply.
A final judgment may now be registered in any other district by merely
filing a certified copy of the judgment, and may be enforced in the same
manner as judgments entered in the district where registered. It is not now
necessary to bring suit on a judgment in another district. The advisory
committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937 recommended the
adoption of a rule providing for registration of judgments in other districts
but the proposed rule was not approved by the Supreme Court.
This new code covers entirely too much subject matter to justify an
attempt to outline all of the changes in the law which it brought about. I
could only hope to hit the high spots and call attention to matters to which
I attach some importance. If I have succeeded in arousing the curiosity of
the members of the bar to the extent that you will be persuaded to examine
this code in connection with your federal court litigation, I will feel that
my undertaking has been a success.

Attorney-General Rules on Retirement Act
The following letter from Attorney General John W. Metzger was sent
to Philip S. Van Cise as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Colorado
Bar Association on August 19, 1949:
Dear Mr. Van Cise:
Your letter of August 13, 1949, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee
of the Colorado Bar Association, I assume, transmits a copy of a letter dated
July 22, 1949, from C. S. Fredrickson, President of the County Judge Association, concerning certain phases of H. B. No. 154, the so-called Judges
Retirement Act.
1. To what counties does the act apply?
2. Is the population to be determined by the local federal census, or
what?
3. Does the 10 years of service begin at and after the effective date of
the act, or is it controlled by the number of ycars of service of the judge before
and after its passage?
In answer to the first question, Sec. 1 of H. B. No. 154 reads as follows:
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"Extension of Coverage. Commencing July 1, 1949, in addition
to the present membership of the Public Employees Retirement Association of Colorado. There shall be included therein all judges of
district courts, juvenile courts, and county courts, in counties of more
than 20,000 population, in this State, and such judges shall have all
the rights and privileges and be charged with all the duties and liabilities hereinafter provided in this Act."
This section was amended during the passage of the bill by the General
Assembly by the insertion of a comma after the words "county courts," and
the phrase "in counties of more than 20,000 population." When the bill was
enrolled, the comma after the word "population" was omitted. I am of the
opinion that the intention of the legislature was to apply the limitation only
to juvenile judges and to county judges, in counties of more than 20,000
population in this state.
2. The population is to be determined by the last federal census, as
given in the Colorado Year Book, or other official sources.
3. While the act is not specific as to the exact method of determining
the years of service rendering judges eligible for retirement and disability
benefits, there is a clear implication in Sec. 2 of the act relating to the method
of exemption for present judges, that service of judges prior to the effective
date of the act, May 5, 1949, is to be included in the determination of such
eligibility. All persons, when serving as judges, become and remain subject to
the act unless, within 30 days after the effective date of the act, written
notice of rejection is given to the State Employees Retirement Board, and, in
the case of a county or a juvenile judge, notification to the Board of County
Commissioners, with a copy for the Retirement Board. There then follows a
definite provision that any judge who has thus exempted himself from mem,
bership in the retirement system may, at any later date, apply for and become
a member,
"***except that only the service of such judges rendered as such
after the date of such membership shall be allowed by the retirement
board in computing retirement benefits." (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislature had intended to exclude prior service of present judges
who automatically became members of the retirement system, the exclusion
of such service for judges rejecting the act and subsequently becoming members
would not have been so clearly set forth.
As you are well aware, this somewhat ambiguous point, and numerous
other provisions of the law, require clarification at some forthcoming session
of the General Assembly.
Respectfully,
JOHN W.

METZGER, Attorney General.
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Current Decisions In Constitutional Law
By

EDWARD

H.

SHERMAN

of the Denver Bar

j

I

Freedom of Speech and The Need for Public Order
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 69 S. Ct. 894
"Underneath a little issue of Terminiello and his hundred dollar fine lurk
some of the most far-reaching constitutional questions that can confront a
people who value both liberty and ordcr"-(JAcKSON, J.)

The importance of the Terminiello case lay in the promise it held. It
seemed as though a precise and grave issue would be answered by the court.
The facts in this case presented dramatically a problem that has arisen in
almost every community. When men speak in public halls or on the streets,
expressing ideologies that are to our way of thinking dangerous or hostile,
when they incite people to anger or unrest or riot, shall they be buppressed
or punished? What does freedom of speech, guaranteed by the First Aniendment, mean? Shall we grant it to those who would deny it to us or who seek
by their speech to change our institutions? The case contained the hope of
an answer that yet remains unfulfilled.
The facts of the case can only be understood by reading the opinions of
the Illinois Appellate Court, 74 N.E. 2d 45, the Illinois Supreme Court,
71 N.E. 2d 2, and the minority opinion of Justice Jackson. Terminiello, advertised as a Catholic priest, was brought to Chicago to address a gathering
which had been called by Gerald L. K. Smith. The auditorium was filled to
capacity with over 800 persons present. Outside of the auditorium a crowd
of about 1000 persons violently protested against the meeting. There were
disturbances within the auditorium and outside. The crowd was angry and
turbulent. The Illinois court found that Terminiello had called members of
the audience "scum" and other abusive words; that he used abusive language
and incited an actual breach of the peace within the auditorium. The court
further held that his conduct in scheduling an address invited a storm of
protest which resulted in innumerable acts of violence and that by his provocative and inflamatory utterances he instilled in his audience the fear of
revolution; that he indulged in hate-mongering against racial groups; that
all of this speech tended to incite the majority of his audience to immediate
violence against the angry mob outside.
Terminiello, after jury trial, was found guilty of disorderly conduct in
violation of a city ordinance of Chicago and fined $100.00. The conviction
was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court,
but the United States Supreme Court reversed, the majority refusing to
answer whether the content of petitioner's speech was composed of derisive
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fighting words which were beyond protection of the Constitution. Instead,
the majority discovered in the record one instruction which it held to be error.
The trial court had charged that "misbehavior may constitute a breach of
the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest or creates a disturbance or if it molests the inhabitants in the
enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm". The majority held that
the ordinance as construed by the state court permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought
about a condition of unrest. The court said the petitioner was not convicted under a statute so narrowly construed that it only punished conduct
constituting "fighting words". Petitioner might have been convicted under
parts of the ordinance which make it an offense merely to invite dispute or
create a condition of unrest. Under the Stromberg case, 51 S. Ct. 532, a
general verdict cannot be sustained where it might rest upon one part of a
statute which is unconstitutional and where it might well be that the defendant was convicted under that part.
Dissenting Opinions Reveal Significance of Case
In dissent, Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Frankfurter castigate the
majority for reversing a sentence upon a constitutional ground that was not
urged in any of the state courts nor argued before the Supreme Court. The
charge to the jury was not a bit of abstraction. The fact is that the Illinois
courts construed the ordinance as punishing only the use of "fighting words".
The minority held that the petitioner's speech had been found by the jury to
come within such category. Justice Jackson pointed out that, when the trial
judge instructed the jury, he was not speaking of harmless or abstract conditions, but referring to the concrete behavior and consequences disclosed by
the evidence. The true significance of the case is brought to light when
reading the evidence cited by Jackson in dissent.
Jackson insists upon a judgment on the merits of the case. To him the
court has substituted a dogma of absolute freedom for irresponsible and provocative utterances. He does not deny the legal right of an American to
advocate any kind of ideology or to express any sentiments. Where, however, speech is made in the context of violence and disorder and provokes
immediate breach of the peace, it cannot claim constitutional immunity. The
state and the city have the right and duty to prevent and punish rioting. In
some cases the authorities must deal with speech as also an offense. There
was here, he argues, no prior censorship or suppression upon Terminiello.
The state does not punish him to silence the ideology he expresses or to discriminate against him or the facts which he represents. Freedom of speech
exists only under law and Terminiello's theoretical right to speak would
have no reality if Chicago should withdraw its protection when the crowd
threatens Terminiello. Should society have nothing to say, then, about his
behavior which may force others into dangerous action?
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To Jackson the case represents not an isolated conflict of political, racial
or ideological opponents, but a world-wide conflict between organized groups
of revolutionaries. To him the record shows their strategy to master the
streets. The opinion of the majority has sterilized the power of local authorities to preserve the peace.
It is hard to accept the charge of Jackson that the majority has "substituted a dogma of absolute freedom for irresponsible and provocative utterances", for the truth is that the court did not reach the issue which Jackson
dealt with. If the decision means anything it means that freedom of speech
will be constitutionally protected even where it invites dispute, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. It is
based upon the concept that only through free debate and free exchange of
ideas does government remain responsive to the will of the people. The
majority does suggest that freedom of speech is not absolute. When the need
for public order conflicts with freedom of speech then it is still the "clear
and present 'danger" test, formulated many years ago, which expresses the
limitation to this freedom. Thus the court in this case says that speech will
be "protected unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of
a serious substantive evil that arises far above public inconvenience, annoyance
or unrest".
Reflections on The Case
I should like to comment briefly upon the real problem in this case.
In talking of freedom of speech we know that we must distinguish between
speech that involves the public interest as against the private interest. Mr.
Chafee analyzed the two interests in the "freedom of speech" which is protected by the First Amendment. There is the individual interest for men to
express their opinions on matters important to them if life is worth living,
and the social interest in attainment of truth. The difference between these
two interests can be understood by comparing such cases as the Cantwell case,
60 S. Ct. 900 and the Chaplinsky case, 62 S. Ct. 766. It seems clear that where
speech serves individual or private interest it may well be under legislative
control. We know, for example, that obscene, abusive language, and fighting
words, may be restrained. In such cases there is no social interest in the
attainment of truth. The speech is not an expression of ideas in which the
public has an interest. We also know that speech may be more than the
expression of thought, but a form of action. "Every idea is an incitement".
Freedom of speech must mean more than freedom to indulge in academic
discussion. We know that all incitement to action may not be abridged or
punished.
Let us consider the Terminiello case as though the speech expressed ideas
in which the public had an interest. Although it incites to action, can it ever
be abridged and how shall we reconcile the clash between the need for public
order and the importance of free discussion in our society? The clear and
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present danger test which is again reaffirmed in the opinion seems somehow
inadequate. Where do we draw the line to mark-off the statements of Terminiello which are permissible and which are not so? Does not the formula
become purely subjective depending upon the judge? Behind the lines can
we say that to Judge Douglas, who did not answer the question, there was
really not a clear and present danger of a serious evil to justify punishment,
while to Judge Jackson it was undisputed? The test does not inform us what
kinds of speech can claim freedom.
If we are to suppress speech which is in the public interest because the
speaker knows it will result in violent protest, would this not be previous
censorship? Could we even have real freedom Qf discussion on public issues
where the reaction of an audience would become so inflamatory or violent as
to incite to breaches of peace? Should we not hold the audience responsible
rather than the speaker and would not society lose if we were to suppress
ideologies expressed in a context of great emotion? Professor Chafee has
sought to clarify the test as follows:
"The principle on which speech is classified as lawful and unlawful involves the balancing against each other of two very important social interests, in public safety and in the search for truth. Every
reasonable attempt should be made to maintain both interests unimpaired and the great interest of free speech should be sacrificed only
when the interest in public safety is really imperiled and not, as most
men' believe, when it is barely conceivable that it might be slightly
affected". Free Speech in the United States, Page 35.
But a serious scholar, Alexander Meiklejohn, (Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government) criticizes this doctrine. Where the speech is a
matter of public discussion, where it is a search for truth even though public
safety becomes imperiled, the search should not be checked. This is the price
of our self-government. To him, the First Amendment relates to the freedom of public discussion and there can be no abridgment of this freedom
even when it incites to anger or violence. "When men decide to be selfgoverned, to take control of their behavior, the search for truth is not merely
one of a number of interests which may be balanced on equal terms against
one another", he says on page 69. "We have decided to be self-governed.
We have measured the dangers and the values of the suppression of the freedom of public inquiry and debate and on the basis of that measurement, having regard for the public safety, we have decided that the destruction of freedom is always unwise, that freedom is always expedient". (Page 65).
Traditionally, the cases on freedom of speech do not embody this concept of Meiklejohn, but if the clear and present danger test is really only a
personal yardstick we might well reconsider its meanings in a period when we
are characterizing any thought which is not orthodox as dangerous.
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Florida Becomes 28th State To Adopt
Integrated Bar
The Florida Supreme Court by rule and order of court has recently
granted the petition of the Florida State Bar Association to become an integrated bar.' This brings the total number of bars having this form of
organization to twenty-eight. All bar organizations west of the Mississippi,
except Colorado, Montana and Kansas are now integrated.
The action of the Florida Supreme Court follows a vote undertaken by
the state bar association whereby 1,131 lawyers voted in favor of integration
and 500 against it, out of a potential lawyer population of 2,700. The court.
in a highly informative opinion calls attention to the fact that not one bar
association, once integrated, has ever returned to the voluntary system in
the 35 years of its history. The opinion continues:
"Letters received from the states in which the integrated bar has been
tested, recommend it as a vast improvement over the voluntary organization
and proclaim that they would under no circumstances return to the old
system.
"When we say the bar is integrated we mean that every lawyer within
a given area has membership in a cohesive organization. An organization of
less than all the members of the bar in a given area would not be an integrated bar. The area may be the state, the county or the city. The integrated
bar has also been defined as the process by which every member of the bar
is given an opportunity to do his part in performing the public service expected of him, and by which each member is obliged to bear his portion of
the responsibility. Annotation 114 A.L.R. 161. Another claim to merit
is that it provides a fair and equitable method by which every lawyer may
participate in and help bear the burden of carrying on the activities of the
bar instead of resting that duty on a voluntary association composed of a
minority membership.
"So the purpose of bar integration is in no sense punitive and there is
not a case on record in which it has been employed as a legal straight jacket
for disciplinary purposes. In some states it has no part whatever in disciplinary measures. In the states where bar integration has been adopted its major
energies are directed to projects designed to improve the administration of
justice, projects that awaken an interest in the science of jurisprudence, that
stimulate professional interest and that give the bar a just concept of its relation to the public. In some states the question of unlawful practice of law,
educational qualification for admission to the bar, and the discipline of members for unprofessional conduct, have been included in the integration agenda,
but they are incidental to the major energies of the integrated bar."
Re: Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 6/7/49.
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After discussing the State Bar of California, whose program since 1927
has resulted in increased confidence in and respect for lawyers in that state,
the court points out that the end result of integration there "is a stronger
and better informed bar, and it has so enlarged the confidence of the public
that its aid is sought for the recommendation to judicial appointments and it
is called upon to sponsor movements for the common good. Whatever it
fosters, it has the advantage of being able to call to its aid one hundred per
cent of its members."
Inherent Power of Judiciary to Integrate Bar
The court then considers whether it has inherent power to integrate the
bar by rule of court, and in that connection decides:
"Inherent power arises from the fact of the Court's creation or from thc
fact that it is a court. It is essential to its being and dignity and does not
require an express grant to confer it. Under our form of government it is
the right that each department of government has to execute the powers
falling naturally within its orbit when not expressly placed or limited by the
existence of a similar power in one of the other departments. In Re Nebraska
State Bar Association, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265. Inherent power should
be exercised with sound discretion. It should never be exercised arbitrarily
or in a despotic manner, neither should it be the product of pressure, passion
or prejudice.
"In 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W. (2d) 604, 151 A.L.R. 586, the question under
consideration was answered in the affirmative, the court saying: 'It has been
held by every court to which the question has been presented that the court
has power to integrate the bar and that the integration of the bar is a judicial
and not a legislative function.' In Re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma,
185 Okla. 505, 95 P. (2d) 113, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma expressed
the same view in these words: 'We conclude that this Court has the inherent power and authority to provide rules creating, controlling, regulating
and integrating the bar of the State of Oklahoma.'
"On June 16, 1944, the Supreme Court of Missouri integrated the bar
of that state by rule of Court. See Rule 7, Supreme Court Rules, 352 Mo.
XXXI.
"As already pointed out, bar integration in this county has been accomplished in 27 states. In Nebraska, Oklahoma, Missouri, and others it was done
by Rule of Court prescribing the powers and functions of the integrated
bar. In some states it was accomplished by Act of the Legislature, incorporating the bar and prescribing its powers and functions, and in other states it
was accomplished by an Act of the Legislature, authorizing the Supreme
Court to integrate the bar and prescribe its functions.
"The courts have taken the initiative in the bar integration on the
theory that bench and bar have a responsibility to support the honor and
dignity of the profession and to improve both the law and the administration
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of justice. The act of the legislature incorporating the bar and those authorizing the court to do so have recognized bar integration to be a judicial function,
in that they often do nothing more than withdraw from the field and memorialize the court to proceed to integrate."
Membership Fees Held Incident to Regulation
The court further considers the question of whether it may impose a
membership fee for the support of the integrated bar. The court concludes:
"If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the bar, it follows that
as an incident to regulation it may impose a membership fee for that purpose.
It would not be possible to put on an integrated bar program without means
to defray the expense. We think the doctrine of implied powers necessarily
carried with it the power to impose such an exaction.
"The requirement of membership in the State Bar Association with the
payment of a membership fee as a condition precedent to practice law has
been upheld in these States. In some of these cases the membership fee was
imposed by legislative act while in others it was imposed by rule of Court.
"Attorneys are not, under the law, State or County Officers, but they
acre officers of the Court and as such constitute an important part of the
judicial system. As was said in the case of In Re Nebraska State Bar Association, supra, the law practice is so intimately connected with the exercise of
judicial power in the administration of justice that the right to define and
regulate the practice naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department
of the government. A court of record has the inherent power to provide the
necessary assistance as a means of conducting its business. In so doing, it may
impose such fees as it may deem proper, that said fees are not a tax but may
be dispensed as the court directs. The last cited case also approves the theory
that while the legislature may impose minimum standards for admissions and
regulation of the bar, the courts have inherent power to impose additional
requirements.
"There is no substance to the contention that the integrated bar makes
one's right to practice law dependent on the caprice of his competitors, in that
it clothes a committee of lawyers with power to discipline for unprofessional
conduct. On the ballot used in the referendum one of the conditions was:
'Supervision of the Bar's disciplinary action by direct review of the Supreme
Court.' We construe this to mean that the investigation and trial of a lawyer
for unprofessional conduct must be a judicial proceeding in the manner provided by law or rule of this Court as defined in Petition of the State Bar
Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280. So the effect of the referendum was
to reenact the law already in effect. The matter of prescribing courses of
study and requirements for admission to the bar is also vested in this court by
law. They meet the requirements of the American Bar Association and there
is no suggestion here that they should be changed.
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"The states catalogued in this opinion as having adopted bar integration
were not the first to experiment with it. The English Bar was integrated early
in its history and, as we understand, has never abandoned integration. A study
of the objections voiced to integration convinces us that a great deal of misunderstanding has been generated about its objectives. The name given it was
perhaps unfortunate. It was not readily assimilated. It doubtless precipitated
some into an intellectual fog and one's natural impulse is to kick out of such
a phenomenon rather than put out the cerebral energy necessary to dispel it."
Experience Shows Objections Groundless
"It cannot be gainsaid that integration will be what the bar and the
court make of it. It was never designed to sacrifice the freedom and initiative
of the bar, its boldness and courage in challenging the cause of the downtrodden, nor its inherent independence in taking up battle for the minority.
It is no more akin to unionism and the closed shop than it is to the Rotary
Club or the Presbyterian Church. Nor was it intended as a means to aid groups
and cliques in the exercise of arbitrary power or to enforce their will on
others. In states where the integrated bar has been approved no such charges
have been lodged against it. Its avowed opponents have invariably become its
ardent supporters and the strength of its enlarged membership and budget
have enabled it to undertake many projects for the improved standing and
strength of the bar that it could not undertake with a minority membership.
The objections raised here to the integrated bar become utterly groundless in
the face of the fact that in every state where it has been adopted, whether by
rule of court or act of the legislature, it was done subject to supervision by the
courts. The work being accomplished by the integrated bar of California is
perhaps the strongest practical refutation of such thesis.
"Bar integration grew from a felt necessity for an organization that could
speak for the profession in esse. It is not a compulsory union but a necessary
one to secure the composite judgment of the bar on questions involving its
duty to the profession and the public. It is hardly necessary to assert that the
bar has a responsibility to the public that is unique and different from that
exacted of the members of other professions. This difference is symbolized in
the requirement that every lawyer subscribe to an oath to support, protect
and defend the constitution of the United States when he is admitted to practice. On the theory that he is such an important factor in the administration of
justice this Court has held that a lawyer's responsibility to the public rises
above his responsibility to his client. The very nature of our democratic
process imposes on him the responsibility to uphold democratic concepts regardless of how they affect the case in hand.
"There was a time when bar integration would not be supported
as strongly as it can at the present. The reason for it now is not discipline for unethical conduct but to alert the bar to professional and
public responsibility. We take no stock in the accusation that the bar
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is not worthy of public trust, we think by the square foot it contains
as many members of unblemished character as any profession. At
the same time we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that, like the institutions of our country, it is under attack and that we have a duty to
meet and attack courageously. We think this duty devolves on the bar
as a whole rather than on a minority organization of it. The assault
on our institutions which the bar is expected to take the leading role
in challenging also requires the impact of the full manpower of the
bar. We do not think bar integration would be worth the candle as
a specific for unethical conduct, but as a means of giving the bar a new
and enlarged concept of its place in our social and economic pattern
it has amply proven its value.
"Bar integration may impose curbs on professional freedom. Likewise,
every other business must give place to restrictions that arise in the face of
growing populations. While alone on his island Robinson Crusoe enjoyed a
much greater degree of freedom than he would enjoy if he lived in Tallahassee at the present, but no one in Tallahassee would exchange the degree of
freedom he now has for that enjoyed by Crusoe. If Jacksonville should find
itself in the throes of a yellow fever epidemic the State Board of Health would
not hesitate to quarantine its citizenship and draft its full manpower including
doctors to put down the epidemic. Twice in the lives of many now living we
have drafted the young manhood of the country to put down what was said
to be an assault on democratic institutions. Growing populations and changing
conditions necessarily give rise to social and economic complexes that require
wisdom and discretion to cope with. The bar should be the first sector of the
population to comprehend this and order its house to meet such emergencies.
Mere Money Making Not Worthy of Profession
"We are conscious of the charge that the history of professional organizations since the 'guild' system of the middle ages has been one bent on enlarging
the economy and selfish designs of its members. The answer to this charge is
that if bar integration is to be nothing more than a spring board to leap for
power and pay and perquisites, if it has no purpose other than to grab at the
expense of others, it is unworthy the noble traditions of the profession. The
bar increases in public esteem by the precepts it lives by, not by the money it
makes. In fact, if money making is the lawyer's sole purpose, he worships a
god that is too small. If he does not approach the law as an avenue to perform
a fine public service, work hard, live by faith and die poor, he should turn
to some other business for food and shelter and raiment. It is true that now
and then one turns trader and finds the coveted pot of gold but not so if he
sticks strictly to his profession. The very nature of the lawyer's business is that
of trustee. If he makes a featherbed of that to sprawl on and pulls the cover
over his head oblivious to the things taking place around him he invites
merited criticism or disaster.
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"It follows thdt petitioners have made a case which warrants a rule of
this Court in integrating the bar of Florida as prayed for in the petition. It
provides the best means yet devised to enlist the full manpower of the bar in
the execution of its duty. It is also shown that in states where the integrated
bar has been tried, it has revealed none of the abuses lodged against it, but
on the other hand it has restored public confidence in the bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the bar's responsibility to the public, has
improved the administration of justice and is the only means presented
whereby every member of the bar can share in its public and professional
responsibility. We do not believe it will relieve the bar of ethical anemics,
crackpots and communists. Certainly this class should be screened out but the
law school is the logical place to do it. Moral sensitiveness is a rebound from
home discipline. A law to prohibit a man making a fool of himself would be
as effective as one to improve his morals.
"It is our view that integration would best serve the interest of the bar
and the public, that the objections raised to it are not well grounded, so the
petition to integrate is granted."

Knotis Men, Frunt and Scenter
Royal R. Irwin of Denver recently submitted the following Location
Certificate, recorded on June 25, 1918 in Book 205 at page 528 of the Jefferson County records, with the comment that in his opinion the Location Certificate is legally sufficient, "although the language and spelling used by the
Locator may be a bit confusing." With this masterly bit of under-statement
as a preface, we present the certificate verbatim:
KNOTis "ALL MEN" BY" These Presents "That i Louisa" E. Briggedettet Citey & Countey" oFF Dinver" & 1825 & 1317"26" STREETE" Room
"19" Denver, Colorado "Location "THE" Mountezell" Tunnel & Chall & Inn
Cline, Loads Mining Claim & And by THISS" Certificate" and by "right"
of" discovery "and" And" Location" Coaim" Mountzell Mining Claim "1500)
Hundred" Feete Lines And" Hoorizontal" Mesurement" along "The" thereof
With "All Itsdigs angles and "vareiations" as "allowed" by" law (3) Hundred
"FEETE" Wide on said vain "running" East & "West" from "Centre of the
discovrry" (3) H"S" 75 feet" and (11) Hundred "Running" feetrunning
"yains and Loads" FROM" the center of "discovery", cain & Incline" together with" side and Frunt "Stake"; feet no each" side of the Middle of
said vain at " surface and "all yains, lodes, ledges"; deqossite and surface"
ground within" the line of said, claim, situatee in "DEER CREEK, MINING
DISTRICT" Mining, Countey of Jefferson and "State of Colorado" and
described by "metes and bounds as follows, towit" Begging" at corner, no (1)
Adjoin-Barten "Load" Stake (7)-East" Cide Line"-Mountzell' "Stake No
(2) Thenn (seven Hunder, &, Fiffey. (75) Too, END" Off said Claim
Mount "ZELL "Stake" (3) Won "HUNDRED & FIFTEY" A lienient"
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FEETE & (150) Feete" Center" No" (4) BARTEN "LOAD: No" (5)
'Vain: Wone :Hundred & Fiften (150) FEETE" Too: Cide-Stake "No (5)
vain & LOad" orr PLASSER"-SVEEN" HUNDRED" Fiftey "FEETE"
(750) Too Scide End "Stake" (7) Then Hundred "last SCENTER" STAKE
BRENTH"& (150) To,;; STAKE",No" (S) Then "Too" CENTER
"STAKE" NO" (1) Wone "Stake, oFF, Begging "OFF" Said" Minningg"
Claim" "known" Mountvzell "Section" Eleven" (11) Townchiq Six" " (6).
Range "SEVENTY (70) "West" iNN" Jefferson "County" Sta-it" "OFF"
Colorado This "Load was Discovered" on" the 18 day' pf May, 1918, "Buy"
Louisa Evline Briggedgettet OFF 26" St & 1317-26" St" ROOM "19" &
2424" BLAKE STREET" DENVER" Col.

r................-...-.....................
................... . .................
..................................

..........
.....
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Affirmation Without Opinion and the Right of One Co-Tenant to Sue
Another In Conversion
It is submitted that as a proposition of law one co-tenant does not have
a right of action for conversion against another in this state at the present
time. Following what is obviously an inept and thoroughly discredited practice of affirming decisions without written opinion, the Supreme Court recently upheld a decision of the district court in the case of Weber vs. Seilbach
et al., 118 Colo. 578, allowing such a suit.
A complete transcript of the whole record and the entire testimony in
the case, together with lengthy and detailed law briefs with full specifications
of error, were filed in the Supreme Court. The only result was an evasion
of the argument entirely by the terse affirmation of what appears to us to
have been an unwholesome and indefensible verdict and judgment in the trial
court.
The right to maintain the suit in the district court at Greeley was attacked at the outset by a motion to dismiss. This right was contested throughout the entire suit. It was directly in issue in the case, was pointed out on
the motion for a new trial, and by the specification of points to the Supreme
Court. Even after the case had gone to decision, the error was again pointed
out in a petition for a rehearing, but the Supreme Court steadfastly refused
to discuss or rule upon this point.
(Mr. Weber thereupon submitted his brief, too long to be reprinted
here, on the point of law which was urged as ground for dismissal. In substance, the brief supported the proposition that since Section 3603 of the
Revised Statutes of 1908, permitting one co-tenant to sue another, had been
repealed by Section 11 of the Laws of 1932 at page 456, then the general
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common law rule should prevail that trover will not lie in favor of one cotenant against another.)
Many of the younger members of the Colorado bar may make the same
mistake that I made several times early in my career, i.e. assume that because a certain Supreme Court decision exists which by its terms unequivocally lays down a proposition of law, then that is the law, and clients may
be safely advised accordingly. This writer is one who has lived to learn
differently, and to know that the appellate court will sometimes for reasons
of expediency, or, because it believes a just result is obtained by ignoring or
overriding its former decision, completely disregard its own precedent.
The device by which this evasion is accomplished is known to the initiate
as "Affirmed Without Written Opinion." It is my position that such affirmations, when they ignore former decisions of the high court, or, override them
without distinguishing those decisions from the case at bar, tend to make
the court appear whimsical and inconsistent, and, in the end, destroy the
prestige of the court.
OLIVER W. WEBER,
Boulder.
Is Double Mileage Authorized In Serving Writs?
Mr. George Fischer, County Attorney
Adams County
Brighton, Colorado
Re: Two mileage fees to be paid Sheriff by litigant for serving process 15
miles, i.e.
2 writs, same address at 75c
30 miles roundtrip at Sc
30 miles roundtrip at Sc

1.50
2.40
2.40

Total
Paid

6.30
3.90

2.40
Balance objected to
In response to your letter . . . when I objected to paying the above $2.40
to the sheriff, I thought he was charging double mileage because two writs
were served-and I quoted the eighth paragraph of Sec. 16, C 66 as forbidding it.
However, my note to him stated that if he thought I was wrong an
additional check would be sent. He apparently thinks me wrong, so I am
sending him an additional check-but with the understanding that if you
and he subsequently are convinced that opinion is against you, you will
return the $2.40.
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Now to answer the unexpected question you raise of double mileage
being otherwise authorized: You apparently urge that a litigant must pay
one mileage pursuant to Sec. 16, C 66 and a second mileage pursuant to
Sec. 76, C 66. (Facetiousness is here irresistible-and one must add: "nice
work if you can swing it-this would pay for a number of deputies-but
things are getting tough all over").
To respond that this contention is unheard of-is true enough, though
not a legal response. However, annotations to Sec. 76 refer one back to
Sec. 16, where the annotations thereunto refer to Sec. 76 as providing a
"separate and distinct mileage" and cite 21 Colo. 158. Language there at
pp. 167, 168 suggests, rather than the radical departure from normal of a
double mileage, that Sec. 16 (the fee act) was meant to prescribe what the
litigant pays and Sec. 76 (the salary act), to prescribe what the officer keeps.
This language is as follows: "* * * in the main, the one relates to fees,
the other to salaries. The former prescribes what charges the officers may
make, and what fees they may collect, out of which their salaries are to be
realized; the latter fixes the salary and the maximum of the total remuneration. * * * The salary act was intended to provide a compensation to public
officers, and among them to a sheriff, for the performance of official duties.
Such compensation, however, must be paid out of the fees prescribed, and
out of them only. * * *"
As two lawyers are no more likely to agree then when others argue
religion-and as I would like to create some sort of issue without the expense of litigation-I will enclose a copy of this to DICTA. Also, an information copy to Judge Davies.
o
GEORGE LANGDON COOPER,
Fort Morgan.
Martindale-Hubbell Changes Due
Information regarding changes in listings in the Martindale-Hubbell Law
Directory (1950 edition) for subscribers as well as non-subscribers, including
the address of a former firm member or associate if known, should reach the
publisher at Summit, New Jersey, not later than September 20th. If so requested, this information will be held in confidence until the publication date
which will be about January 1st, 1950.

Charles J. Traylor of the law firm of Adams, Heckman & Traylor,
Grand Junction, has been appointed by Governor Knous as a member of the
Colorado Board of Veterans Affairs.
H. Lawrence Hinkley, former Attorney General, has announced the
removal of his law offices to 635 Majestic Building, Denver.
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